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A Duty to Disclose? An Analysis of
Chiarella v. United States
Wesley A. Cann, Jr.*

I.

Introduction

During 1975 and 1976 Vincent Chiarella was employed as a
"markup man" in the New York composing room of Pandick Press,
a financial printer. When copy from a customer arrived at the shop,
Mr. Chiarella would select type fonts and page layouts and then pass
the manuscript on to be set into type. Among the various documents
that he handled in the course of his employment were five announcements of corporate takeover bids, four involving tender offers and
the other concerning a merger. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed when these documents
were delivered to Pandick Press (the actual names to be sent on the
night of the final printing), Mr. Chiarella was able to deduce the
names of the target companies before the time of the final printing
from other information contained in the documents. With this
knowledge he purchased stock for his own account in the target companies without disclosing to the sellers the information he had
learned. Immediately after the takeover attempts were made public
he would sell these shares. In one such takeover, Mr. Chiarella
earned a profit of $16,138.87.' Over the course of fourteen months
he made $30,000.2
Under these facts, it would appear to most that Mr. Chiarella
breached a duty owed to the sellers to either disclose his information
prior to trading or abstain from trading until the takeover bids were
announced. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 3 and Rule
* B.A. University of Connecticut 1969; J.D. University of Connecticut 1972. Assistant
Professor in Residence-Business Law, University of Connecticut.
1. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
2. Id
3. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or

10(b)-5 4 apparently create such a duty. Clearly the information
known by Chiarella was both material and nonpublic. Furthermore
his trading in the stock was to the direct detriment of the uninformed
sellers. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated, the essence of
Rule 10(b)-5 "is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the
securities of a corporation has access, directly or indirectly, to information [that is] intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone may not take advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing ' 5 and as a result "anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or . . .
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con6
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed."
Despite these apparent admonishments, the United States
Supreme Court recently found that Vincent Chiarella owed no duty
to disclose this material, nonpublic information to the sellers before
trading and, consequently, that he committed no act of fraud against
them.7
Because this case involved mere silence on the part of the defendant, as opposed to an actual misstatement of fact or an omission
to state a fact necessary in order to make statements already made
not misleading, the Court opined that in order for fraud to exist
there must in fact be an affirmative duty to speak. The creation of
such a duty in turn requires the presence of something more than
simply the possession and the use of material, nonpublic information. There is nothing particularly revolutionary in such a position
and there was no disagreement between the majority and the dissentinstrumentality of interstate Commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4. Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shaft be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1972).
6. Id
7. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

ers in regard to the fact that a duty to disclose was a prerequisite for
a finding of fraud in this case.
The critical question, however, and the question which caused
such a dynamic split in both the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court, is what in fact gives rise to such a duty to speak? This is a
question that has plagued federal courts for years, and will continue
to do so despite the five-to-four decision in Chiarella. Is the existence
of such a duty, or the lack thereof, dependent upon who possesses
the information e.g., a corporate insider, a tippee, a market insider?
Is the manner in which one acquires the information relevant? Does
it matter where the source of the information is located? Or is this
duty dependent upon some sort of 'fiduciary' or 'special' relationship
either to the issuer or to the other party to the transaction?
It shall be the purpose of this article to examine the various positions taken by the members of the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court in regard to the question of what precisely gives rise
to the duty to disclose. After a brief review of the decisions themselves, specific analysis will be made of the Supreme Court decision
in light of the policies of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.
II.

The Decisions

A.

The Court of Appeals

In January 1978, Vincent Chiarella was indicted on seventeen
counts of willful misuse of material nonpublic information in the
connection with the purchase and sale of securities in violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. He was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on every
count. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
after pointing out that Chiarella in fact "used confidential information obtained through his job in a financial printing house to anticipate impending tender offers,"' upheld the conviction.
In doing so, the court of appeals rejected Chiarella's argument
that because he was not an insider of the target companies, he did
not owe a fiduciary duty to the target shareholders and was not subject to the 'disclose or abstain' rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur. In its
rejection, the court pointed out that the fact that Chiarella was not
an insider of the companies in whose stock he traded was "irrelevant."9 What was relevant was that a financial printer such as
Chiarella "is as inside the market itsel/as one could be." 10
Thus the court recognized that not only do traditional corporate
8. 588 F.2d at 1362.
9. Id at 1364.
10. Id (emphasis added).

insiders and tippees have the duty to disclose or to abstain from
dealing, but that such a duty also extends to those who can be categorized as "market insiders." In the words of Chief Judge Kaufman,
"/ajnyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." "
In holding that this duty exists, the court pointed out that "[flor
the securities market to function properly, it is essential that those
who occupy such strategic places in the market mechanism be forbidden to reap personal gain from information received by virtue of
their position, [and that 10(b)-5] is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information."' 2 Therefore, since Chiarella had access to confidential information 3 these policies created a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading on his part.
Judge Meskill in his dissenting opinion, took the position that
Chiarella did not have a duty to disclose to the sellers, and that the
creation of the new category of "market insider" (in which former
'outsiders' would henceforth be placed), was not only a break with
tradition, but also a departure from prior law. 4
In support of this position Judge Meskill noted that no case has
been cited in which civil liability for nondisclosure has been imposed
under section 10(b) on anyone other than an insider, a tippee, or one
who has a special relationship with the other trader. Additionally,
no case was cited in which anyone has had criminal liability imposed
against them. Instead, Judge Meskill argued, the obligation to disclose has traditionally been confined to: "persons with a special relationship to the company affected by the information"; persons who
have "inside information obtained by reason of access to the issuer";" "persons who are in a special relationship with a company
and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties
in trading in its securities"; 7 "insiders (explicitly defined in terms of
their relationship with or access to the issuer) and tippees of insid11. Id at 1365.
12. Id
13. "[Elven the most unscrupulous officer... could scarcely have a greater opportunity
to reap sure profits than market insider Chiarella had ..
" Id.
14. "Today's decision expands § 10(b) drastically.., and, alarmingly, it does so in the
context of a criminal case." Id at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
15. Id (citing Fleisher, Mundheim and Murphy, An InitialInquiry Into The Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA.L. REV. 798, 804 (1973)) (emphasis added).
16. Id at 1374 (citing I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 7.4(6)(b), at 179-83
(1977)) (emphasis added).
17. Id (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)) (emphasis deleted).

ers"; 8 and "insiders, broker-dealers . . .and those undertaking a
special relationship with buyers or sellers of stock."' 9
Because Chiarella did not fall within any of these traditional
categories, the dissent argued that he owed no duty to disclose his
information to the securities sellers. The majority's willingness to
create a new category of "market insiders" represented to Judge
Meskill a failure to resist the temptation to redraft legislation.2"
B.

The Supreme Court

In an opinion delivered by Justice Powell, in which Justices
Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and
concluded that Chiarella's conduct in relation to the sellers did not
constitute a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.
In reversing, the Court recognized that both administrative and
judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities may indeed operate as a fraud
under section 10(b) despite a lack of statutory language or legislative
history dealing with the legality of nondisclosure. The crux of their
decision, however, was that such liability is premised upon a duty to
disclose "arisingfrom a relationship of trust and confidence between
partiesto a transaction."2
Thus the Court rejected the view expressed by the court of appeals that anyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives
material nonpublic information has a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading in the securities. Although such a criteria was limited
to those who regularly receive such information, the Court was of
the opinion that the rationale for such a limitation was totally unrelated to any duty to disclose since the court of appeals failed to identify any sort of 'relationship' between Chiarella and the sellers that
could give rise to such a duty. Instead, the "market insider" theory
would suggest that the use by anyone of material, nonpublic information would be fraudulent because it would give a buyer or a seller
18. Id (citing American Law Institute, FederalSecurities Code (Proposed Official Draft,
(March 15, 1978)) (emphasis added).
19. Id at 1378 (citing Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) and
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931
(1972)).
20. Id at 1373.
21. 445 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
In holding that Chiarella lacked such a duty to disclose the Court stated that
[n]o duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target company's securities for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their
agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
Id. at 232-33.

an unfair advantage over the less informed party.22 The Supreme
Court noted that neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange Commission has ever adopted a "parity-of-information" rule2 3 and, as a
result, not every instance of "financial unfairness" constitutes fraud
under section 10(b).2 4 To uphold such a broad duty would be to
depart radically from "the established doctrine that [a] duty [to disclose] arises from a specific relationship between two parties."25
Thus, the Supreme Court held that a duty to disclose under the
antifraud provisions does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic information, nor from one's position as a market insider, but
from a relationship of "trust and confidence" between the parties to
a transaction. 26 As a result, the trial court's instructions to the effect
that Chiarella owed a duty to everyone (to all sellers and indeed to
the market as a whole), were incorrect.2 7
Chief Justice Burger disagreed. In his dissent, he stated that although it is a general rule that neither party to an arm's length transaction is obliged to disclose information to the other unless they
stand in some confidential or fiduciary relationship, such a rule
"should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not
by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
means. "28 Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5-should be read, according
to the Chief Justice, "to mean that a person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that informa29
tion or to refrain from trading.
The Chief Justice also indicated that the factors that were em22. Id at 232.
23. Id at 233.
24. Id at 232.
25. Id at 233.
26. An argument can be made that the requirement that a 'relationship of trust and confidence' exist was not in fact a 'holding' of the Court since it was not necessary to the Court's
decision. See Part V infra.
27. There is another important aspect to the Chiarella case will not be discussed in this
paper. The question deals with an alternative theory which would support Chiarella's conviction: that he breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted on confidential information obtained in the course of his employment. This issue was not considered by the
Supreme Court since it was not an issue that had been submitted to the jury. The jury instructions show that Chiarella was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose information
to the sellers and the jury was not instructed in regard to any duty that he may have owed to
anyone other than these sellers. As a result, the Supreme Court did not speculate upon
whether such a duty existed, whether it was breached, or whether such a breach constituted a
violation of § 10(b). 445 U.S. at 236-37.
28. 445 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
29. Id (emphasis added).
To support his "misappropriation" theory he cited both the language and the history of
section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. Their provisions, he indicated, reach any person engaged in
any fraudulent scheme, and their language clearly negates any implication that Congress was
only concerned with trading by 'corporate insiders' or with deceptive practices related to 'corporate information.' The antifraud provisions were designed to assure that dealings in securities would be fair and without undue advantages among investors, and to prohibit those
manipulative and deceptive practices that fulfill no useful purpose. An investor, he noted, who
buys on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information possesses such an undue advan-

phasized in the Cady decision,3" specifically (a) access to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone and (b) the inherent unfairness of trading
on such information when it is inaccessible to others, are both present "whenever a party gains an informational advantage by unlawful
31
means."
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, agreed with this position. He refused to subscribe to the majority's suggestion that no
violation of section 10(b) could occur absent a breach of some duty
arising out of a fiduciary relationship between the two parties to the
transaction. Instead, he felt that the Chief Justice's dissent "correctly
states the applicable substantive law-a person violates § 10(b)
whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. ' 32 Justice Brennan concurred in the
judgment, however, because he felt (in contrast to the Chief Justice)
that the legal theory outlined in the dissent was not in fact the one
that was presented to the jury.
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, stated that although he agreed with much of the Chief
Justice's comments he also felt that Chiarella's conviction need not
rest upon a "misappropriation" theory. Instead, he would define the
actions of Chiarella as fraudulent even if he had "obtained the blessing" of the acquiring corporations before conducting his transactions.33
As the above opinions indicate, the Court was split six-to-three
over the question of whether Chiarella's conviction should be reversed. On the much more critical issue, however, regarding the necessity that a "special relationship" or a relationship of "trust and
confidence" exist before a duty to disclose arises, the Court was split
tage and engages in conduct that "quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at the expense of others." Id. at 241.
30. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31. 445 U.S. at 241-42.
32. Id at 239.
33. Id at 246. Justice Blackmun vigorously attacked what he saw as the Court's continuing course of transforming section 10(b) from an "intentionally elastic catchall provision" to
one that catches relatively little, in the instant case by imposing "a requirement of a 'special
relationship' akin to fiduciary duty before the statute gives rise to a duty to disclose or to
abstain from trading." Id "[Tihe securities laws were not intended to replicate the law of
fiduciary relations." Id. at 248. Further, "the Court's approach unduly minimizes the importance of petitioer's access to confidential information that the honest investor, no matter how
diligently he tried, could not legally obtain." Id at 247.
In emphasizing the importance of access to "special facts," and that a "structural disparity" in such access is a "critical factor" in establishing a duty to disclose, he concluded that
"persons having access to confidential material information that is not legally available to
others generally are prohibited by Rule 10(b)-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their
structural informational advantage. ... Id. at 25 1.

five-to-four. Furthermore, the existence of an actual five-to-four
holding in this regard is questionable.
III.
A.

An Analysis
The Securities Acts in General

In undertaking an analysis of Chiarella, and judging both the
inadequacies and future value of the decision, an awareness of the
purpose behind the securities laws is beneficial.
Probably the most frequently cited case in this regard is SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc.3 4 In that decision the United
States Supreme Court stated that it was essential that "the highest
ethical standards prevail in every facet of the securities industry.""
"A fundamental purpose" common to the securities laws "was to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry."36
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the Securities Exchange Act "quite clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation,"3 7 and that securities legislation enacted for the purpose of
avoiding fraud should not be construed "technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."38
The lower federal courts have recognized and honored these
policy statements and have held that the Securities Exchange Act
must be construed "broadly,"3 9 "liberally and flexibly,"' and "not
technically and restrictively."'"
Specifically, the courts have indicated that Rule 10(b)-5 "is
based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information"4 2 and that "members of
'43
the investing public should be subject to identical market risks.
Further, neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10(b)-5 specify particular
34. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
35. Id at 186-87 (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963)).

36. Id The Supreme Court has also stated that "the primary purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act was. . . to. . . 'provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities [and] to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors'." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, p.9 1 (1975)). See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
37. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
38. SEC v. Capital Gains Researcb Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
39. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited, 473 F.2d 515, 521 n.9 (8th Cir. 1973).
40. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 410 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979).
41. SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 828 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
42. SEC V. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1972).
43. Id at 852.

prohibited acts or practices but are instead designed to encompass
the infinite variety of devices that are alien to a climate of fair dealing" and prohibit all fraudulent schemes whether the device employed involves a 'garden type variety' of fraud or presents a new or
unique form of deception.4 5
B.

Chiarella'sConcept of Duty

Consideration will now focus on the Chiarella opinion to see if
the majority recognized "the duty of the courts to be alert and to
as are necessary to make effective the conprovide such remedies
'4
gressional purpose. 1
In its opinion, the majority chose not to examine the policy or
purposes discussed above, other than to note that section "10(b) was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. 4 7
Such a choice was a natural one since the court was, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, placing another limitation on the scope of section
10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. Instead, the Court went directly to the critical issue regarding the legal effect of Chiarella's silence. After noting
that neither the language nor the legislative history of section 10(b)
afford specific guidance for the resolution of the case, the Court undertook a brief examination of the interpretation of the statute and
rule by the SEC and by the federal courts.
1. The Reasoning of the Majority.-The Court commenced its
examination by looking at the Cady, Roberts & Co. 48 decision, a decision which represents a willingness to expand, not to limit, the
scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. In Cady, the Commission
held that the responsibility to disclose or abstain from trading that is
imposed upon those commonly referred to as 'insiders' also extends
to those who receive information from such insiders, i.e. tippees.
The Commission noted that "the purchase and sale of securities is a
field in special need of regulation for the protection of investors [and
that section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-51 are broad remedial provisions
aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not
they are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law
action for fraud and deceit,"4 9 and that they "are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be
taken. . . -"0In light of this language it is ironic that the majority
44.
45.
denied,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See Herpick v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
See Carroll v. First Nat. Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970).
445 U.S. at 226.
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Id at 910.
Id at 911.

should begin- to build its argument around this case, especially since
both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun use Cady in support
of their respective dissents.
Nevertheless, the majority noted that the obligation to disclose
or abstain arises from "[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information [J [which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
insiders, particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders.
We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which,
if known would affect their investment judgment."'" Further, the
majority, paraphrased Cady and stated that the Commission emphasized that such a duty arises from "the existence of a relationship
affording access to inside information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose, and. . . the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure."52
This latter quotation is interesting in two respects. First, the
majority speaks of access to "inside information" intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, whereas the actual passage in
Cady speaks simply of "information" intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose. Similarly, the Court refers to the unfairness
of allowing a "corporate insider" to take advantage of such information while the SEC in Cady referred to "a party" who takes advantage of such information. It could be argued that the "information"
referred to in Cady might include "market information" as well as
'inside information" and that a "party" may include not only traditional "corporate insiders" but "market insiders" or "quasi-insiders"
as well.
Second, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun believed that both factors referred to in Cady were unquestionably
present in Chiarella.13 In this regard the Chief Justice stated that
they are present "whenever a party gains an informational advantage by unlawful means." 5 4 Justice Blackmun, after noting that the
Commission in Cady "regarded the insider 'relationship' primarily
in terms of access to nonpublic information and not merely in terms
of the presence of a common-law fiduciary duty or the like,"5 5 specifically addressed both factors in concluding that Mr. Chiarella occupied a relationship to the acquiring companies that gave him
intimate access to information intended to be available only for a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

445 U.S. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)).
Id, (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
445 U.S. at 241-42.
Id at 249.

corporate purpose and that, by "any reasonable definition, his trading was inherently unfair."5 6
The majority also stated that in Cady, "the Commission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained
confidential information by reason of their position with the corporation."5 7 Laying the foundation for its ultimate conclusion, the
Court then observed that "this relationship gives rise to a duty to
disclose." 8
Although the Court is correct in stating that a relationship of
trust and confidence exists between shareholders and corporate insiders, nothing in the Cady decision indicates that there would be no
duty to disclose unless such a relationship exists. Actually, Cady did
not involve a transaction between an insider and a shareholder, but
rather one between an insider5 9 and persons who would not become
shareholders until the transactions involved were completed. To interpret Cady as requiring that a relationship of trust and confidence
exist between the buyer and the seller of securities before a duty to
disclose arises, would be a misinterpretation of the Commission's
ruling by providing language that is not contained therein and by
deleting the two 'factors' referred to above. If anything, these two
factors are concerned with the relationship between the alleged violator andthe company in whose stock is traded, and not with a particular relationship between the violator and the other party to the
transaction.
If the majority wanted to cite Cady in support of their reversal,
they could have used the argument advanced by Judge Meskill and
noted that the Commission's task in Cady was "to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in
its securities."60 This argument would have been compatible with
Chiarella's claim at trial that since the source of his information was
from outside the target corporations in whose stock he dealt, the information used was not in fact "inside" information.6
Perhaps the Court's failure to examine this issue was based
upon the In the Matter of Investors Management Co. Inc. decision,62
56. Id at 252.
57. Id at 228.
58. Id
59. The insider in Cady was by definition a tippee.
60. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 (emphasis added). In other words, the majority could have argued that even if Chiarella had a special relationship to the acquiring company he did not trade in its securities but rather traded in the securities of the target company.
61. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), ret'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
62. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).

which rejected the contention that no violation of Rule 10(b)-5 can
be found unless it is shown that the violator occupied a "special relationship" to the issuer or to an inside corporate source. On the other
hand, perhaps it was because such an argument could potentially be
avoided by the claim that Chiarella was a "quasi-insider" or that he
possessed "market" information. In either event, this issue was not
addressed by the Court.
The heart of the majority's opinion is found in a brief reference
to four decisions that the Court uses to reach its ultimate conclusion.
The majority notes that "federal courts have found violations of section 10(b) where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit" and it cites Texas Gu{f Sulphur as an example.63
The Court further states that "the cases also have emphasized, in
accordance with the common-law rule, that 'the party charged with
failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to dis"Accordingly", the Court concludes, "a purchaser of
close it' ,.'
stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither an
insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to reveal
material facts."6 5 After a brief analysis of Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States,6 6 the Court announces that although silence
can operate as a fraud under section 10(b), "such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction."6 7 Since Chiarella had
no prior dealings with the sellers, was not their agent or fiduciary,
and was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence, the Court held that no duty to disclose existed.
The Court was correct in its observation that insiders have incurred liability for using undisclosed information for their own benefit. Additionally, the law is clear that silence will only constitute
fraud when there is a duty to speak.68 However, the Court's reliance
on GeneralTime Corp. v. Talley IndustriesInc.69 and Affiliated Ute as
a basis for its ultimate definition of what gives rise to a duty to disclose, is open to question.
The General Time case involved the efforts of Talley Industries
63. 445 U.S. at 229.
64. Id (citing Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
65. Id (citing as an example General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159,
164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)).
66. 406 U.S. 128, reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
67. 445 U.S. at 230.
68. For example, in Keene Corp. v. Weber, 394 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) it was held
that unless there is a duty to speak, silence cannot constitute a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act. The Keene court's
choice of citation for the fact that silence cannot constitute fraud absent a duty to speak is an
interesting one. In Frigitemp the court held that the defendants did not have a duty to disclose
because the information in question was easily obtainable by the plaintiffs.
69. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).

to displace the management of General Time and ultimately to acquire or merge with it. The gist of the complaint under Rule 10(b)-5
was that Talley went about the acquisition of General Time stock
without disclosing either its association with American Investors
Fund, which owned 9% of Talley's voting shares, or its plan for a
merger with terms that might be more favorable than the price paid
for the stock being acquired. In holding that Talley did not have a
duty to disclose this information before purchasing shares, Judge
Friendly stated that "we know of no rule of law, applicable at the
time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no
fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal
circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the
sale."7
Certainly the General Time decision can be distinguished from
Chiarella. In the former there was a failure by a corporation to disclose its own intentions with respect to a merger (and its association
with the Investor's Fund). Mr. Chiarella, on the other hand, was not
trading on simple knowledge concerning his own activities or his
own future plans, but on the basis of information that he 'stole' (as
Chief Justice Burger put it) from a customer in breach of trust.
Thus, the Chiarella case contains an element lacking in General
Time, an element alternately viewed as misappropriation or access
to knowledge concerning the activities of another.
Additionally, the weight accorded Judge Friendly's statement
should be considered in light of two other comments he made. In
General Time, Judge Friendly followed up his statement with the
observation that "[flurthermore, the complaint, filed after the special
bid of February 19 and Industries' subsequent stock buying program, did not allege that further purchases were in contemplation,
and by that time Industries' intentions had been broadcast."'" Arguably, this observation detracts from the impact of Judge Friendly's
previous remark. Additionally, two months later, in the case of SEC
v. Great American Industries, Inc.,7 2 Judge Friendly stated that "to
read Rule 10(b)-5 as placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who in contrast to 'insiders' or broker-dealers did not occupy a
special relationship to a seller or buyer of securities, would be occupying new ground and would require most careful consideration."7 3
This passage clearly indicates that the question regarding the duty to
disclose on the part of a 'non-insider,' 'non-fiduciary,' was left open
by the court.
70.
71.
72.
73.

403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
Id. at 165.
407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
Id at 461.

This is not the first time that a court has taken the position that
there must be some relationship between the two parties to a securities transaction before a duty to diclose exists. In Connelly v. Balkwill,74 for example, the court stated that the duty to speak "arises in
those circumstances where a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation exists, where confidence is reposed or influence acquired, where there
is a justifiable expectancy of disclosure or reliance upon the superior
knowledge of another and in like circumstances."7 5 Similarly, in
Branham v. MaterialSystems Corp. the court noted that the duty to
disclose "exists only in circumstances which indicate an investment
or fiduciary relationship between the seller and buyer, or knowledge,
actual or implied on the part of the seller that unless he speaks the
buyer may act to his detriment."7 6
Despite these lower court rulings, the 'relationship' referred to is
nebulous at best. For example, how can it accurately be said that a
'tippee' or a tippee of a tippee" is in a fiduciary relationship with a
buyer or seller of stock. Nevertheless, in holding tippees liable for
nondisclosure, the courts "have refused to distinguish between 'tippers'-those who violate Rule 10(b)-5 by disclosing inside information to individuals who subsequently trade on the basis of that
information-and trading 'tippees'-those who trade on the selectively disclosed information."7 8 Despite the willingness of the courts
to find liability, by way of 'derivative' responsibility or by way of an
'aider or abetter' theory, a fiduciary duty between a tippee and a
seller or buyer of stock does not actually exist. It is not even necessary for there to be privity between the plaintiff and defendant for
Rule 10(b)-5 to apply.7 9
Similarly, there would not technically appear to be a fiduciary
relationship between an insider and an 'outsider' such as a prospective investor who is not, until the buying transaction is completed,
actually a shareholder of the insider's company. Although a fiduciary relationship clearly exists between a corporate officer and the
shareholders of his corporation, how is such a relationship established when the purchaser is not yet a stockholder? Despite this in74. 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aft'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
75. Id at 59. The court further stated, "But it cannot be supposed that the rule imposes a
duty to speak in all cases involving the purchase or sale of securities irrespective of the relations of the parties or the circumstances under which the transaction is consummated." Id
76. 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
77. See Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
For example, a relative of an insider is no more of a fiduciary of a seller than Chiarella was.
This conclusion was reflected in Zweig v. Hearst where the Court noted that "[wihen a corporate insider gives a tip. . . even ifthe receiver of the tiphas no fiduciaryduty to theplainti, the
congressional concern for the integrity of the marketplace compels liability." Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1270 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
78. In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
79. Shapiro v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974).

consistency, the courts have nevertheless held that "whatever
distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that
an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing
stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members of the
public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce
these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities
acts." 8 0
The willingness on the part of the courts to find that a relationship exists in these instances is reflected in Kohler v. Kohler8 and In
the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc. 82 In Kohler the court
addressed the insider-outsider problem and stated that "it is clear
that the statute was intended to create a form of fiduciary relationship between so-called corporate 'insiders' and 'outsiders' with
whom they deal in company securities which places upon the insiders duties more exacting than mere abstention from what generally is
thought to be fraudulent practices."8 3 In Investors Management Co.,
which concerned the issue of tippees, the Commission noted that one
who obtains material inside information emanating from a corporate
source which places him in a superior position in relation to other
investors, "thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions." '84
The courts also have been willing to expand the duty to disclose
by flexibly interpreting the scope of the term 'insider,' who by definition has a duty to speak. The courts have found that the category of
'insider,' or at least the category of those persons who have obligations
coincident with an insider, include not only officers, directors and
controlling shareholders, but various employees, brokers, dealers,
underwriters, tippees, and friends and relatives of insiders.
This flexibility is reflected in the two factor criteria set forth in
the Cady decision which apparently indicates that the SEC regarded
the insider relationship "primarily in terms of access to nonpublic
information and not merely in terms of the presence of a commonlaw fiduciary duty or the like."8 5 This access approach was supported in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 8 6 when the court recognized that although insiders such as directors and management
officers are of course precluded from dealing using material nonpublic information, Rule 10(b)-5 is also applicable to a person possessing
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 913-14.
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
319 F.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
44 S.E.C. at 644 (emphasis added).
445 U.S. at 249.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972).

such information "who may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within
the meaning of section 16(b)." 8' 7 As a result the Court held that "anyone" in possession of such information must either disclose or abstain from trading.8 8
Thus, as one federal court has stated, an 'insider' is, one who
has "information that another party does not have. . . . The question of who is an 'insider,' therefore, cannot be decided on the basis
of the title one holds in the corporate organization [but rather on the]
basis of what a party knows or reasonably should know considering
the information to which he has access." 89
Despite the existence of these broad definitions, the Supreme
Court majority refused to recognize Chiarella's position as that of an
insider. It could certainly be argued that Chiarella was an insider of
the acquiring companies because the relationship he had with them
afforded him access to confidential information. This status, however, may still not have created a duty to speak on his part since he
would not be an insider of the corporation in whose stock he traded
But could it not also be argued that Chiarella was a "quasi insider"
of the acquired companies as well? (A quasi insider would be a person who obtains nonpublic information from a source outside a corporation about events or circumstances which will affect the market
in the corporation's stock). 90
2. PriorAdverse Case Law.-Courts have not always been as
hesitant to impose liability as was the majority in Chiarella. In many
instances they have attempted to carry out the policy of section 10(b)
and Rule 10(b)-5 in a much more liberal fashion. 9 ' In Ross v.
Licht9 2 the court held that two dentists who purchased stock for $120
per share from the plaintiffs knowing of a proposed private sale of
the stock at $300 and a public offering at $600 per share were under
a duty to disclose this information to the sellers. The dentists were
close friends of the family that controlled the corporation in whose
stock they were dealing; they had at one time made a loan of $10,000
to the corporation; one of the dentists had served as an informal advisor to the corporation; and both had been involved in an oil and
87. Id at 848.
88. Id
89. Harnet v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973), afl'd, 496 F.2d
832 (3d Cir. 1974).
90. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1267 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. Several examples of cases liberally interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 are: Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); S.E.C. v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
1974); S.E.C. v. Great American Industries Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 395
U.S. 920 (1969); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Ross v. Licht,
263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
92. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

mineral investment with one of the members of the controlling family. Nevertheless, neither of the dentists were officers, directors, employees, or even shareholders of the corporation. Nor were they
members of the financial community such as brokers or underwriters. Yet the court, in applying the "access" test to determine whether
or not a person should be deemed a corporate insider, stated that
these two dentists were insiders also.93
The case of Zweig v. Hearst Corp.9 4 involved a financial columnist for a Los Angeles newspaper who purchased 5,000 shares of
stock in American Systems Inc. (ASI) at a discount price of two dollars per share. The bid price of the stock on the day of the purchase
was 3-5/8 dollars per share. Two days after acquisition he wrote a
favorable column about the corporation, presumably with the intent
that the column would cause a rise in the price of the stock. The day
after the article appeared, the columnist sold 2000 of the shares for
five dollars per share. The action against him was brought by the
parties to a corporate merger who claimed that the story resulted in a
temporary inflation of the price of the ASI stock and consequently a
decrease in the number of ASI shares that95the plaintiffs were to receive pursuant to the terms of the merger.
The plaintiff alleged that the columnist was under a duty pursuant to Rule 10(b)-5 to disclose to his readers that he had bought ASI
stock at a discount price two days before, and that he intended to sell
some of it at a higher market price resulting from the publication of
his column. The plaintiffs also felt that he had a duty to disclose that
it was likely that his column would be re-published as an advertisement for ASI in an investment periodical in which the defendant had
a substantial ownership interest. The rationale for these allegations
was that the readers of the column should have been able to judge
for themselves whether the defendant's personal motives for promoting ASI affected the objectivity of the article.
The court in Zweig reversed and remanded the grant by the trial
court of the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that "in failing
to disclose these facts, [the defendant] violated section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)-5 just as corporate insiders do when they withhold material facts about a corporation's prospects while trading in its stock."96
The court noted that although "his relationship to the public was not
a fiduciary one under common law, [this conclusion was] not disposi93. Id at 409.
94. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
95. Plaintiffs also claimed that the column was misleading and erroneous, but there was
no claim that the columnist was aware of such a fact or that he intentionally sought to mislead
his readers.
96. 594 F.2d at 1267.

tive of the Rule 10(b)-5 claim."9 7 Instead, the defendant was a
"quasi insider"98 who had a duty to disclose his stock ownership, his
intent to sell when the market price rose, and that the column would
likely be republished as an advertisement for ASI.
Not only did the Zweig court find that the defendant owed a
duty to his readers, but it also held that he owed a duty to the plaintiff who would be receiving a smaller number of ASI shares. The
court recognized that in order for these plaintiffs to recover, they
must show that a relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant that would give rise to a duty to speak. They also recognized that in traditional common-law terms it was difficult to make
out such a duty because the plaintiffs had not even read the defendant's column before deciding to purchase ASI stock. Nevertheless,
the court found that the plaintiffs were in a position similar to that of
the defendant's readers, that they had strikingly similar stakes in the
processes of the market, and that as a result the defendant owed a
similar duty to them.
SEC Y'.Shapiro9 9 represents a more traditional section 10(b)
case. In Shapiro the SEC brought an action against Mr. Berman
(among others) for allegedly trading in stock while possessing material, nonpublic information and without disclosing such information
to those with whom they traded. Shapiro and Berman were partners
in a firm that specialized in arranging mergers and acquisitions. In
October 1970 they began efforts on behalf of Ridge Manor Development Corp. to arrange a merger with Harvey's Stores Inc. On December 11, 1970, the president of Ridge Manor supplied Shapiro
with unaudited financial information concerning Ridge Manor's
earnings for the year. With these figures, Shapiro and Berman prepared a consolidated financial statement showing that if the two corporations merged, Harvey's earnings per share would rise from
twenty-nine cents to at least two dollars and twenty-four cents. On
January 6, 1971 Berman and several other persons met with one of
the directors of Harvey's and after the director was presented with
this data, he stated that although some of Harvey's officials opposed
the merger, he viewed it favorably and would raise the issue again
with the other members of Harvey's board. After the meeting
Berman purchased stock in Harvey's at 7-1/4 dollars per share.
As the merger plans progressed, Berman continued to purchase
additional shares. On February 5, 1971 a public announcement was
made that Harvey's was conducting merger negotiations with two
unidentified companies and on February 8, 1971 Berman sold 600
97.
98.
99.

Id at 1269.
Id. at 1267 n.9.
494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).

shares at prices ranging from 18 to 18-3/4 dollars per share. After
further announcements were made Berman sold his entire holdings

in Harvey's at prices between 21 and 22-1/2 dollars per share.
The court held that such action on the part of Berman constituted a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. Berman was
found to be in violation despite the fact that he was not a traditional

corporate insider, namely a director, officer, or controlling shareholder. Instead, he was a 'corporate marriage broker' and as such
was (like Pandick Press in Chiarella) an independent contractor.
Additionally, in discussing the materiality of the information

that Berman had at his disposal prior to his initial purchase, the
court noted that by that date (1) the defendant already knew that the
president of Ridge Manor desired a merger with Harvey's; (2) the

president of Ridge Manor had given Shapiro, his partner, nonpublic
information about Ridge Manor's earnings for 1970, which had al-

lowed Shapiro and Berman to project a rise in earnings in Harvey's
stock; and (3) the negotiations between the two corporations had

recommenced and resulted in one of Harvey's directors promising to
propose the merger to Harvey's board."° It is important to underscore that the knowledge referred to in (1) and (2) above was acquired by Berman from a source outside the corporation in whose
stock he traded, namely from the president of Ridge Manor. This
situation is analogous to the fact situation in Chiarella.
SEC v. Great American IndustriesI0 involved, in part, the sale
of land to Great American. The 'seller' of the land received Great
American Stock and some cash in return. One of the issues
presented involved payment by the seller of five-sixths of the
purchase price to 'finders' who had brought Great American and the
sellers together. The obvious inference was that if the seller was willing to pay this large amount to these 'finders,' Great American was
in fact paying far more than the property was actually worth. When,
at the time of the closing, an official of Great American read a provision of the contract which stated that no finder had brought about
the transaction, neither the seller nor the finders responded. Based
on these facts the court held that the seller and finders, who were
present at the closing and who did not speak up to clarify this statement, committed common-law fraud actionable under Rule 10(b)-5.
The duty to disclose in this instance was based upon commonlaw fraud, and a duty to speak was found because it was necessary to
prevent partial statements of fact from being misleading. The court,
however, specifically left open the question of whether Rule 10(b)-5
places an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons including sellers
100.
101.

Id at 1306.
407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).

and finders who, in contrast to insiders or broker/dealers, did not
occupy a special relationship to the buyer of securities.' 2
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, oI appears to
play a pivotal role in Chiarella. This decision was used by the
Supreme Court majority in support of its opinion, but it was also
used by the majority of the court of appeals and by the dissenters in
Chiarella to support their respective opinions. As a result, there is
an obvious disagreement concerning the exact holding in Affiliated
Ute.
In Affiliated Ute a group of American Indians formed a corporation to manage the assets generated by tribal holdings. This corporation issued stock to its Indian shareholders and designated a local
bank as its transfer agent. Because the actual value of the shares was
difficult to ascertain, the corporation requested the bank to stress the
importance of retaining the stock to the individual stockholders.
Two of the bank assistant managers, however, helped the shareholders dispose of their stock. The assistant managers knew that two separate markets existed-a primary market of Indians selling to nonIndians through the bank and a resale market of non-Indians selling
to non-Indians in which higher prices prevailed. The Indians who
had sold in the primary market and received less for their shares
than those who sold in the secondary market, brought an action alleging that the managers had violated section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5
by failing to inform them of the higher prices in the resale market.
The Court found that under these circumstances the assistant managers had violated Rule 10(b)-5.
In the majority opinion in Chiarella, the Court relied primarily
upon the Court's statement in Affiliated Ute that "if the two men and
the employer bank had functioned merely as a transfer agent, there
would have been no duty of disclosure here."'"
The majority
pointed out, as did the Court in Affiliated Ute, that the bank had not
simply acted as an agent but had also assumed a duty to act on behalf of the shareholders and that the plaintiffs had relied upon its
personnel when they sold their stock. This, the majority in Chiarella
implies, supports their conclusion that before a duty to disclose
arises there must first be a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. The court of appeals majority in Chiarella and
Justice Blackmun in his dissent, on the other hand, see Affiliated Ute
102. Id at 460. The Court observed that "[it] must be conceded that imposing on sellers
of property or finders a duty of full disclosure to a buyer issuing securities in exchange ...
would increase the protection afforded investors." Id As Judge Kaufman stated in his concurring opinion, "any claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction in connection with
the sale or purchase of securit:ies must be scrutinized with care, whether or not there would
have been liability at common-law for such a deed." Id at 463 (Kaufman, J.,concurring).
103. 406 U.S. 128, reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
104. Id at 152.

as standing for the proposition that the bank and its employees were
subject to the duty to disclose under Rule 10(b)-5 "because of their
strategic position in the marketplace,"'0 5 and their intimate knowledge of both the primary and resale markets.'06
Admittedly, some language in Affiliated Ute appears to indicate
that a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the
defendants. For example, the Court noted that the acts of the assistant managers were "performed when they were obliged to act on
behalf of the mixed-blood sellers."' 0 7 Further, the Court noted that
the sellers "relied upon them when they desired to sell their shares"
and that the bank had acknowledged that it would be acting for the
individual stockholders. 0 8
On the other hand, there is strong language in Affiliated Ute to
support Justice Blackmun and the majority in the court of appeals
for the proposition that the decision was based upon other criteria.
In imposing liability the Court noted that the defendants were not
merely transfer agents but were actively encouraging a market for
the stock among non-Indians; that they were receiving increased deposits because of the development of this market, as well as commissions and gratuities from expectant non-Indian buyers; and that they
were "entirelyfamiliar with the prevailingmarketfor the shares at all
materialtimes. ,"109 "The individual defendants, in a distinct sense,
were market makers. . . .This being so, they possessed the affirmative duty under the Rule to disclose. . . .,''o
In either event, although the majority in Chiarella was correct
when it cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that no liability would
attach if the defendants had been mere transfer agents, the Court in
Affiliated Ute did not say that a fiduciary relationship or a relationship of trust or confidence must exist before a duty to disclose arises.
Simply because there may have been a relationship of trust in Affiliated Ute does not mean that there must always be such a relationship. As Justice Blackmun indicated, given the factual posture of the
case, it was unnecessary to resolve such a question."'
105. 445 U.S. at 251.
106. Because of the disagreement over the holding in Affiliated Ute it is interesting to note
that Justice Blackmun, who wrote the vigorous dissent in Chiarella and who saw Affiluated Ute
as standing for the proposition that liability attached because of the defendant's place in the
market system, was the Justice who actually delivered the opinion of the Court in Affiliated
Ute. On the other hand Justice Powell, who delivered the majority opinion in Chiarella, took
no part in the consideration or decision of Affiliated Ute.
107. 406 U.S. at 154.
108. Id. at 152.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id at 153.
111. 445 U.S. at 251.

IV.

The SEC Response to Chiarella

The Securities and Exchange Commission has not been silent in
face of the majority's opinion in Chiarella. Instead it has adopted a
new antifraud rule establishing a 'disclose or abstain from trading'
requirement in specific regard to material, nonpublic information relating to tender offers.
Rule 14e-3(a) states that "if any person has taken a substantial
step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer" then
any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such a tender offer which information he knows or has reason
to know is both nonpublic and has been acquired directly or indirectly from the offering person, or the issuer of the securities sought,
or any officer, director, partner, employee, or other person acting on
behalf of the offeror or the issuer, shall either disclose such information to the public prior to dealing or abstain from trading in the securities. 112
This rule would clearly be applicable to the situation presented
in Chiarella. In the release accompanying the rule, the operation of
section 14e-3(a) was illustrated by a series of examples. One of these
examples stated that a person who "steals, converts or otherwise misappropriates" from the offering person any material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer does indeed have the duty to
13
either disclose or abstain from trading.'
This rule, however, is at best only a partial answer to Chiarella
since its application is limited solely to information relating to tender
offers. Thus, it does not confront the critical question presented by
the majority's position (or at least by the majority's implication) that
there is no duty to speak absent a relationship of trust or confidence.
Rather than addressing this fundamental premise and its potentially
broad application to all kinds of information, the Commission has
simply attempted to carve out one exception to it. While covering
the specific acts of Vincent Chiarella, it leaves open the rationale of
the decision and its applicability to an infinite variety of other situations.
Certainly the adoption of this rule indicates that the SEC is taking the position that the use without disclosure of material, nonpublic information in the context of tender offers does in fact constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practice. This stand is, of
course, consistent with the overall philosophy of the Commission. It
is possible, however, that the adoption of this rule may also have a
collateral effect that is not consistent with that philosophy. Since the
112. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3(a) (1981).
113. S.E.C. Release No. 34-17120 (Sept. 4, 1980), 20 S.E.C. Docket No. 17, page 1250
(Sept. 16, 1980).

Commission has now adopted a 'disclose or abstain rule' which
specifically and solely deals with information concerning tender offers, it could conceivably be implied that for those in positions similar to Mr. Chiarella's there is in fact no duty to disclose information
that relates to other matters. Precisely whether or not the courts will
use this implication as further support for the majority's position in
Chiarella and whether or not the Securities and Exchange Commission will choose to make further, and perhaps, broader attacks on the
court's position are questions that remain.
V.

Conclusion

In holding that Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers to disclose
his material nonpublic information before trading in the stock and
by indicating that such a duty is created by a relationship of trust
and confidence, the Supreme Court took a much more conservative
position than the court of appeals with regards to the scope of section
10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. The Supreme Court had a variety of alternatives at its disposal but it chose to accept none of them. It could
have found a duty to disclose by holding that Chiarella was a quasi
insider, a 'market insider,' a person who had access to 'special facts,'
or a person who had misappropriated information. Conceivably, it
could have held that Chiarella's action constituted some form of an
'implied misrepresentation"' 4 under Rule 10(b)-5.
The majority's failure to accept any of these alternatives raises
the question of whether the Court gave deference to the legislative
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Did the Court interpret the statute and the Rule broadly and flexibly, not technically
and restrictively? Did the Court attempt to insure that the highest
ethical standards would prevail in every facet of the securities industry and that a philosophy of full disclosure would replace that of
caveat emptor? Was the Court attempting to assure that all investors
would have equal access to information, that all investors would
have equal risks, and that no investor would have an undue preference or advantage over another?
Perhaps the majority's conservatism reflects the concern of some
that unless the expansion of section 10(b) is arrested it will "cover
the corporate universe." I5 It may also reflect the fears of the securities industry that if the court of appeals decision had been upheld
"anyone involved in the market process would have serious
problems because they would most certainly know-just by the na114. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 913.
115. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1976), citing Cary, Federalism
and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974).

ture of their jobs-things about a stock that others don't know."' 6
These fears, however, are not completely justified in light of the
inherent limitations of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5. Those involved in the market process are protected because the statute and
the Rule reach only material information. Further, there is no prohibition against using information that is either available to the other
party 17 or would be discovered by the other party's exercise of due
care. " 8 Finally, there is absolutely no obligation on the part of any
insider "to confer upon outside investors the benefit of his superior
financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated guesses
or predictions."' '" On the other hand, if the information that a person possesses is material, is unavailable to, and unattainable by, the
other party, and is not information resulting from skill, reasoned
analysis, or interpretation of equally accessible facts, its use should
be prohibited by section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.
For those who wish to see the Court take a more liberal and
imaginative approach to the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5
there is still hope. First of all, the Chiarella decision does not stand
for the proposition that Mr. Chiarella did nothing wrong and did not
violate Rule 10(b)-5 in any way. The question regarding the breach
of the duty that Chiarella owed to his employer's customers is still an
open one.
Further, an argument can be made that the precedential value
of the majority's position, that a relationship of trust and confidence
must exist for a duty to disclose to arise, is extremely weak. The
basis for this argument is simply that the majority's indication that
such a relationship must exist was unnecessary for the resolution of
this case. The district court's charge permitted the jury to convict
Mr. Chiarella if it found that he "willfully failed to inform sellers of
target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover
bid that would make their shares more valuable" 2 ° and to find that
Mr. Chiarella employed a scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose
.. . material nonpublic1 information in connection with the
' 2
purchases of the stock."'
The majority noted that these instructions failed to state that the
use of such information was not a fraud unless there is an affirmative
duty to speak. "In effect, the trial court instructed the jury that peti116. 66 AM. BAR Assoc. J.427 (April 1980) quoting William Fitzpatrick, general counsel
for the Securities Industry Association.
117. See Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414,418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974) and Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir.
1975).
118. See McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
119. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
120. 445 U.S. at 226.
121. Id at 236.

tioner owed a duty to everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market
as a whole. The jury simply was told to decide whether petitioner
used material nonpublic information at a time when 'he knew other
people trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information.' ""22 Such instructions demonstrate, the majority
continued, that Chiarella "was convicted merely because of
his fail1' 23
ure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers.'
Thus it appears that the trial court erred when it in effect instructed the jury that mere possession and use of material nonpublic
information constituted a violation of section 10(b). It further erred
by failing to instruct that when an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, a necessary element for conviction is an affirmative
duty to speak. In noting this error the majority stated that "We hold
that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not 24arise from the
'
mere possession of nonpublic market information."'
Consequently, all that was necessary to overturn Chiarella's
conviction was a finding that the jury was not instructed in regard to,
and did not consider, a necessary element of the crime. And in light
of this conclusion, those who desire to see a broader and more flexible umbrella protecting the integrity of the marketplace may take
solace in Chief Justice Burger's observation that "(tihere is some language in the Court's opinion to suggest that only 'a relationship between petitioner and the sellers . . . could give rise to a duty [to
disclose.]' . . . . The Court's holding, however, is much more limited, namely that mere possession of material nonpublic information
is insufficient to create a duty to disclose or to refrain from trading."' 2 5 Precisely what is needed in addition to such possession is an
argument that may very well continue.
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